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
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Political Forces in Spain

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YOU ASK ME to comment on a lady writer's article appearing in one of the best New York's liberal weeklies and especially on her conclusion that—"There is one chance in a thousand that the Azana government will be able to consolidate a liberal-republican democracy. There are perhaps two chances in ten that the right will crush labor and the liberal and install its dictatorship. The other eight chances are in favor of a victorious Socialist revolution."

I shall not say a word about the lady's arithmetic, and I shall not say that she does not know her shawls and pottery. It is evident, however, that the lady has found her facts and method of analysis in the happy essays of New York, and possibly Barcelona, Trotskyists. This appears immediately in her addiction to that curious politico-theoretic patois which—a by-product of the wistful first years of the C.I.—has been developed to a high degree abstruseness by the followers of Leon Davidovitch, who look back to the period of 1919-1923 as to the golden age of the Russian brand of communism. Her set of mind—or heart—also becomes evident in her exaggeration of the importance of the very earnest but numerically and politically weak Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, whose mighty title spreads over the recently consummated union of the Spanish Trotskyites and the B.O.C., the right-wingers expelled from the Spanish Communist Party during the crazy "third period". Her "Bolshevik-Leninist" (Trotskyite) refraction of vision also comes out in her cutting allusion to the Communist Party of Spain. It also appears in her exaggeration and embellishment of the political intentions of the Spanish population and her tendency to substitute vanguard intentions for the outlook of the mass. Her slight acquaintance with the behavior of capitalism in general and with the particular situation in Spain comes to the top in her assurance that giving land to the peasants "would split the entire capitalist structure" and to "satisfy the security and wage demands of the urban proletariat"—this also "they (the bourgeois government) cannot do *within the present system, without money* (!)". This is a restatement of Maurin, one of the leaders of the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista who in a recent article professed that Azaña's government would end in 1936 as it ended in 1933, for "it will make concessions to the bourgeoisie and will lose support of the working-class masses." Therefore, the one chance out of a thousand for the continuation of the republic; two out of ten for fascism; eight out of ten for a socialist revolution!

All of this—arithmetic and prophecy—ought to be found exciting reading by the social workers and literary folk in New York City who like to read political romance but who, in spite of their eager sympathy, really guess that it is just nice romantic make-belief. There is no doubt that Spain is in for a lot of political turmoil and that always makes interesting reading. The mightiest political force in Spain today is the Popular Front, dominated numerically by the Socialist Party, flanked by the Left Republicans and the C.P. The Socialist Party, like the so-called socialist parties in other lands, does not stand for socialism. It is the political expression of the desire of the workers and small business to ameliorate their condition within the capitalist system. Both the "right" minority faction headed by Besteiro and Prieto and the "left" majority headed by the aged Largo Caballero flaunt the

issue of socialism like a holiday flag. But by "socialism", they, like Strasser, Blum, Stalin and Hitler, mean government ownership.

It is true that to aid the further capitalist development of Spain the time has come for the national government to intervene and take over and control certain branches of industry of which the private entrepreneurs because of their landowner hangover have made pretty much of a mess.

The Prieto section of the Socialist Party of Spain is afraid to assume the responsibility of a pure S.P. government. They are careful politicians. They know that their rule would in time disillusion their followers, and they would lose support, as the social democrats in other lands after similar attempts to manage capitalism. Caballero appears very "left" and seems to be ready to take over the government of the country, but he never says that clearly. He is an old bluffer, who may yet become an important figure in a mixed republican government. But the fact is that now both factions of the S.P. would prefer to remain just a "popular opposition" in a democratic republican State.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN is, according to the Party of Marxist Unification, in "ideology, tactics and social composition only a new edition of radical-socialism (Herriot, Daladier). It is, in fact, more a bourgeois than a worker party." Meeting in April, the Central Committee of C.P.S. resolved that Spain was facing "not a socialist-democratic revolution but simply a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Therefore the necessity for the proletariat, at the same time that it exercises an intelligent and methodic influence on the present Government, to push it forward, hold it up and support it. . ." That is, Azaña's bourgeois republicanism is to be supported. The Committee also called for the "popularization of the program of our Party in the democratic-bourgeois revolution, the program of the Worker and Peasant Government," whatever that means.

The P.O.U.M. critics of the Communist Party of Spain call it "a bourgeois party incrustated in the breast of the labor masses." The fact is that the C.P.S. (like the C.P. of any other country) is a social-democratic organization whose activity is somewhat hampered and made ridiculous by the usual Communist Party addiction to Russian revolutionary history and its terminology. It may in time even challenge the S.P. in its influence over the Spanish masses. The C.P.S. has not the scruples of the S.P.S., which is more answerable to the opinion and will of its membership. It is bolder in its claims. It has a better press, a better publicity staff; it disposes of more money; though its present membership is probably not a twentieth of the S.P. The new "democratic" "Popular Front" line of the C.I. lends itself to the growth of Communist parties. What is happening in France may yet begin happening in Spain.

There is, however, the likelihood of the early absorption of the Communist Party of Spain by the Spanish Socialist Party. Since the Seventh C.I. Congress there has been no actual difference between the two organizations, excepting features of party organization. When Largo Caballero turns to the "fraction presidents" of his party with the proposal of fusion, he expresses the outlook of the majority of the party functionaries. So that Spain may be the first country where the much talked of "organic unity" of the two

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wings of the old Social-Democracy comes true. Only the Communists' fear that their loss of organizational identity may be a signal for absorption in France can stop the C.P. of Spain from early amalgamation. For in France, the Communist Party has the chance of surpassing the Socialist Party and thus dominating the labor political field in behalf of the diplomatic needs of the U.S.S.R. However, the Spanish Communists have seconded the S.P.S. in every way. And now both organizations appear to have joined in a campaign against the P.O.U.M., a campaign of the usual "Communist" misrepresentation begun recently by the C.P. *Mundo Obrero*.

I HAVE ALREADY referred to the P.O.U.M. Its outstanding personalities are Andres Niñ, the former Trotskyite, and Joaquín Maurín, the head of the late Spanish "Brandlerite" Communist group. (It is hard to describe a Communistoid organization without paying one's respect to this or that "leader." Sometimes, the characterization appears ridiculous to the uninitiated. Thus, the B.O.C. were referred to by German Communists as Spanish "Brandlerites" and by the New Yorkers as Spanish "Lovestone-ites"! But such are the merry intricacies of the "dialectics" of "Marxism-Leninism.") The P.O.U.M. has attracted to itself some anarcho-sindicalist and other non-Communist elements. The organization as a whole, unlike the typical splinter Communist group, is paying less attention to the old scholastic arguments as to whether the situation parallels closely the Russian experience or errs in that respect, or whether the Spanish propertyless are acting according to the "1905 period" or having their July or June days, whether or not they are acting according to the edited Lenin or are sinning on that count.

The partisans of the P.O.U.M. sometime lay claim to having brought into existence the *Alianza Obrera*, which made possible the relative unity of the workers during their armed resistance to the reactionary Clerical government in 1934. The fact is that the *Alianza* should always be mentioned in the plural. The *Alianzas* were arrangements of liaison or unity of action made between the local political and union groups. While the C.N.T. of Barcelona refused to give this alliance its official support, the C.N.T. of the Asturias and elsewhere inspired and led the fight. Indeed in many localities, the militants of the C.N.T. were the only ones to do the fighting, though the lawyers of the S.P. and the poets of the C.P.S. now orate and sing rhapsodically of their heroic October.

THE ALIANZA AS A national institution is quite dead. The P.O.U.M. does not like to see it superseded in importance by the Popular Front. They say that the Spanish Popular Front is just only a populist organization. They call for the continuation of the local *alianzas*.

That falls in with the general political activity of the extremist elements in the C.N.T., who have for the last five years made repeated attempts to seize power in various localities.

Another proposal is the amalgamation of the C.N.T. and the G.T.U. A union of this sort will no doubt be useful to the workers in their economic struggle. Yet there is the danger of the domination of a single national labor organization by the S.P., which now disposes of the G.T.U., and the future domination by the State represented in a probable S.P. government.

We must recall in this connection that the G.T.U. grew with the direct help of Primo de Rivera, who favored it during his dictatorship in order to lessen the influence of the C.N.T., considered by all governments, semi-fascist, republican, and social democrat, to be an implacable enemy of "law and order."

The C.N.T. has suffered many casualties in its ceaseless battle.

But it is being outstripped by the G.T.U. for the simple reason that the great majority of workers want a trade union to help them better their conditions and do not want to sacrifice their jobs to revolutionary adventure. That also accounts for last year's split in the C.N.T., resulting in a rival organization, centered in Valencia and opposing the F.A.I. dominance of the Barcelona C.N.T.

In evaluating the present political forces in Spain and in estimating the role that the C.N.T. may play—in spite of the opposition it faces from the side of law and order, in spite of the "advanced social-democratic and Communist leadership," in spite of the disapproval of all "responsible" elements—, we should take into account the events that followed the famous presidential review of two weeks ago. You recall that at the review one of the hated Civil Guard was killed. The rightists turned his funeral into an anti-republican demonstration. Contrary to the government order, the funeral procession marched down the Castellana. As a result, three workers were killed and thirty wounded. Caballero, Prieto and the editor of the Communist paper went to Azaña, who promised to pass a law abolishing fascist rightist organizations, as the *Falange*. The Socialists and Communists were satisfied, made speeches and wrote editorials. The C.N.T., recognizing the danger in the rightist provocations and seeing there was no time for delay, called a strike, which enlisted even the G.T.U. (Socialist) membership. For two days industry and commerce in Madrid were dead; the city was in total darkness at night. Whereupon Azaña rushed through his legislation, and the *Falange* and its like were disbanded; army officers, even those on the retired list, were warned not to take part in anti-republican activity. The officers of the Civil Guard who organized the provocationist funeral were punished or dismissed.

The "second" Spanish revolution—its so-called "socialist" revolution—will most likely consist of a bid for power by the workers on the part of the C.N.T. What will happen, in view of the popular strength of the S.P. and in view of the relative backward economic level of the country, can be guessed. However, the syndicalist "militants" will not be as easily downed as were the advanced Russian workers whom the bayonets of the Bolshevik state drove out of the factories they had seized in 1918-1919. The Spaniards will fight. The F.A.I. spirit persists. It may spread, and bring forth a second Commune, which this time will be drowned in blood by a republican state having the support of the pseudo-Socialist and Communist parties.

WHAT IS THE F.A.I.? The F.A.I. is a group of extremely brave and idealistic young men who see in the trade union not only an arm of defense in the daily class struggle but the true instrument of a complete social transformation. Their tactic is to seize a city, a town or a village, to chase out the representatives of the State and then invite the population to organize itself freely. They tried it during the first days of the Republic. They will try it again as confusion grows, to the great discomfort of the Socialists (right and left), the Communists and even the P.O.U.M. Though thoroughly utopian when judged by the results of their activity, they must be recognized as the most earnest set among the various sets of "saviors" now attempting to manipulate the population of Spain.

I shall write more about the F.A.I. in the next issue, in which I shall also deal with the following topics: the possibility of an S.P. government; the tendency to a new rightist reaction on the part of the population and the organization of a general movement for "law and order"; and the chances of a "socialist" revolution in Spain.

Translated by H. J.

STREICHER'S TRADE SECRET

• Ernst Pærell

From "Zeitschrift fuer politische psychologie und sexualoekonomie," Kopenhagen.

JULIUS STREICHER'S anti-Semitic sheet has a circulation of 500,000. It is read by about 3,000,000 persons. Wherein lies the influence of the "Stuermer"?

This particular Nazi publication makes a practice of retailing the dirtiest sort of pornography. But we cannot oppose that flood of smut, lying and brutality merely by branding it as pornography. We must first understand why the paper is read by millions of workers and government employees. There must be some tendency in these people that Streicher plays on in his desire to hold their attention.

The National-Socialist racial policy is the kernel of the German fascist ideology. It is also the clearest expression of the reactionary stand on the sexual question.

There is the theory of "race poisoning." The blood of a human being belonging to one "race" is poisoned through sexual intercourse with a member of another race. Jews are represented as blood poisoners, attackers of young girls and perpetrators of sex murders. Just as the Nazi leaders divert anti-capitalist feelings of the masses from activity against capitalism by reviving the old belief that "Jew" means "usurer," so they attempt to tie up anti-Semitism with the economic and sexual interests of the population. It is obvious that no attempt at a scientific discussion on the merits of the race theory can succeed against the excitement evoked by the Nazi anti-Jew agitation. The tendency to stifle the natural expression of the sexual instinct is more marked under fascism than in bourgeois democracy. And from this sex repression spring attitudes and feelings that are most receptive to Streicher's brand of pornography. Streicher holds the interest of his readers by printing the smuttiest and most blood-thirsty phantasies of the sexually hungry individual.

Streicher's accounts of supposed Jewish criminality abound in descriptions of sexual and sadist acts. The latter are either given in minute gruesome detail or the phantasy of the reader is left free to fill in and enlarge as it pleases. Medical experience teaches us that many youths find such reading a morbid way of satisfying their sex instinct.

But Streicher not merely feeds this sickly tendency of his readers. He is also very skillful at provoking and implanting in his public new phantasies that have up to now been quite unknown to sexual pathology. (*Omission.*) Let us consider some examples that show clearly how Streicher's stories about Jews feed the most extremely perverse images of the sexually sick individual.

We see in one picture how Jews cut off a child's organ. This picture must have a terrible influence on the subconscious and conscious life of the young. For the thought that the organ may be cut off in punishment for sexual intercourse appears at one time or another in every adolescent's mind. This discovery of Freud's is undisputed. Streicher's repeated *Schachtjude* ("Slaughter-Jew") means today for his readers a Jew that castrates. In the dreams of many persons the cutting away of the organ is symbolized by the cutting of the throat. Another picture in the "Stuermer" shows this very thing. Imagine the anxiety and rage it excites in millions.

Examples of Streicher's Phantasy:

The young 20-year old Helmeth Daube was already a graduate. He was bound for his home about two o'clock in the morning. At five his parents found him lying dead on the street in front of the house. . . . (We omit here Streicher's detailed description of the mutilations found on Helmeth. There is always the mutilation of certain two parts of the body.)

* * *

One day the old Jew attacked the unsuspecting non-Jewish woman on the roof. . . . After this he used to steal into her room whenever he pleased, as it could not be locked.

* * *

A young newlywed couple went strolling outside of Paderborn and found in the middle of the road a chunk of human flesh. Looking closer they found to their consternation that it was the . . . of a woman's body.

* * *

The Jew had cut the girl into one-pound chunks. He and his father strewed the pieces over the neighborhood. She was found in the woods, in a meadow, in the pasture, in a pond, in a brook, in a drainage canal, and in a dung ditch. The cut-off breasts lay in the hayloft.

* * *

While Moses throttled with his handkerchief the child which Samuel had laid on his knees, the second Jew cut off with his knife a piece of the cheek. The others gathered the blood in a bowl, and at the same time, pricked the unclothed sacrificial victim with needles. . . .

* * *

The woman's attempts at self-defense did not cool his eagerness. He tried to close the window so that the neighbors might not look in. Then he again touched the woman in his contemptible Jewish way. . . . He told the woman not to be so prudish. He shut the doors and windows. His language and acts became more shameless. . . . All her objections were of no avail. . . . He laughed at her warning that she would call for help. . . . From his mouth came the grossest and most indecent words. Then like a tiger he threw himself on the woman to complete his devilish work.

Streicher is an extreme psychopath himself. He is the more dangerous because he expresses his own sickness by provoking the most morbid and perverse sexual emotions in the masses. And this assures him at the same time the sale of his paper.

Translated by F. H.

Before you rush off to enlist in your favorite army to save the world from this and from that or to make it safe for that and for this—stop and read

WAR AND REVOLUTION
by SIMONE WEIL

in the June issue of the INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. A daring analysis that cuts through all fashionable makebeliefs, whether conservative or so-called revolutionary. A classic of the emancipatory movement.

New Turn in Soviet Literary Front

• V. Alexandrova

From "Courrier Socialiste," Paris

THE GENERAL LINE has not been officially abolished. The upper layers of Soviet society—including the "leading" writers—appear to be satisfied with its results. Yet meanwhile, a most significant revision is taking place along the entire ideological front—a revision of morals, art, everyday life. And this with the full knowledge, nay, active participation, of the official guardians of the "line."

On every level of the official ideological structure are busy energetic folk who have been assigned to carry out a major reconstruction of the building. In contrast to such concepts as "world socialist revolution", "dictatorship of the victorious proletariat", which, at the beginning of the revolution, used to occupy a triumphant place in the narrow newspaper columns, we now see expressions like "the Great-Russian people", "Soviet realm", "native land, displaying the self-assurance of concepts conscious of their own value, while revolutionary slogans make place for them politely and considerably.

The writers and publicists affected by this revision display various reactions toward it. One part of the literary community is now rejoicing in the secret feeling of relief. It welcomes the "big broom" which is sweeping the "literary slag" out of literature and life, which has declared a "fight to death" against "all poetic stutterers, slobberers, windbags and dimwits, no matter with what slogans they may cover up their incompetence". (K. Chukovski). Other writers, as Aseyev, Pasternak, Olesha, cannot conceal the "painful feelings" inflicted upon them by the recent directive articles in *Pravda* pertaining to art. A third section—it is very numerous—is hurriedly "rebuilding itself".

In an analysis of the results reached at the plenary meeting of the Writers' Union in Minsk (published in a previous issue of C.S.), I had occasion to note the fact that the official resolution, couched in "left-wing" language and apparently giving a general approval to the poetic tendencies of the last few years, does not represent the actual conformation of forces within the Soviet literary community. And indeed, scarcely had the writers had time to go home, when a whole series of conferences, initiated by the central committee of the Writers' Union, opened in Moscow, the chief slogan being the struggle against "left trickery", formalism and naturalism.

BEFORE ENTERING INTO an analysis and an evaluation of these conferences, it is necessary to point to the circumstance that the most distinguished prose writers and critics have, to date, not responded to the insistent official invitations to take part in these meetings. This boycott is practical proof that the leadership of the conferences is controlled by the numerous and well organized faction of "enthusiasts", the subject of whose enthusiasm is indifferent to them, as long as it is approved and recommended from above.

And indeed, why should not V. Inber, a specialist in formalist trickery when it was in fashion, now storm against the "cunning nature" of this same formalist trickery in others, especially since her fine ear has caught dissatisfaction with it among the authorities? Or why should not another poetess, Adalis, who has made her career by conforming to the general line, elegantly renounce, in

the course of self-criticism, her former infatuation with "acmeism", now that, waking up, "still sleepy, still lazy", she remembers: "my heart is Lenin"? "She hears Stalin, thereby sees Lenin"; and all this platitudinous doggerel gives her the right to speak in the name of the literary community and to abuse Pasternak for his "infantilism". —A broad target are these our "enthusiasts"—and a pity that we have no Shchedrin to aim at it!

With the reports of these writers' conferences in mind, the question at once arises: why, after so many years of generally acknowledged successes of "socialist realism", has it suddenly come to light that actually its successes have been negligible; and why is there nothing substantial to show for all the decisive years of the general line, except, as noted in Stavski's fundamental report, for Sholokhov's *Upturned Soil* and the third part of Fadeyev's novel *The Last of Udege*, which continues the theme of provincial Russia into the civil war? How has it come about that almost all the big writers are guilty of formalism, which its very ideologists have long ago denounced and which, incidentally, has never enjoyed popularity? The Who's Who of the formalist movement in our literature is not at all elaborate. At the time of NEP, a small group of young writers and critics met in Leningrad and set as its aim a study of formal methods of artistic production. The critical works of this group (Shklovski, Eichenbaum, et al.) represent an interesting contribution to the theory of literature. While engaged in a study of formal creative methods in the past of our literature, they succeeded in reaching an original and deep insight into the social history of the country. The formalist writers sought a way out of the blind alley in which Russian prose had found itself since the beginning of the revolution, in a complicated concreteness of the subject built upon large generalizations (see Fedin's *Cities and Years*, Kaverin's *Khaza's End*, etc.) It suffices to follow the artistic growth of Kaverin, to understand that the work done by him has not been futile.

It is true that to this almost unorganized group there attached themselves also certain accidental people from the non-party youth—birds who had fallen from bourgeois nests during the revolutionary storm, who in the study of the formal moments of creative art sought possibilities to depart from the present time with a good excuse, or, to use Kaverin's striking expression, "to fool reality".

FINALLY, one may conditionally class with the formalists certain writers, like Zamyatin, Pilnyak, Kazakov, the early Ogn'yov (see his *Brew of the Republic*), who, in their eagerness to fix all the irreproducible wealth of revolutionary actuality, tried to incorporate it by means of broken narration, reorganization of the subjects, etc. This made it difficult for the reader to comprehend the matter in its entirety, but it was not considered by him as "trickery" and formalist sophistication. For this very brokenness and complication of the story coincided with the brokenness of life itself during the days of the revolution (see Pilnyak's *The Naked Year*). If writers were less scared by the orders of the authorities, they would understand that it was entirely senseless for them to renounce this formalism at their conferences.

Comprehensible, therefore, are the anxiety, the pain and the confusion evident from the utterances of the best Soviet writers and poets, when they see how, following the *Pravda* articles, the "big broom", together with examples of trivial "trickery", is sweeping away also valuable products of artists in various branches of art. (All the artistic "fronts" are suddenly found to be "diseased"). These feelings are especially understandable because the combat against formalist trickery has been joined by the very same people who, a week before the publication of the *Pravda* articles, wrote of the "remarkable artistry" of Shostakovich and felt in his music to the ballet *Brilliant Brook*, "the burning of our days, the dynamics of our epoch". And now, just as unanimously and with the same "Bolshevik frankness", they expose in the works of this composer a "noisy cacophony", they make Meyerhold responsible for the productions of his untalented imitators, they bemoan the "anti-democracy" of literary formalism.

It is against these obedient bureaucrats "with insultingly indifferent hands" who do not love and do not understand art, that B. Pasternak arose in his appearances at the Moscow conferences. As a sad commentary on the character of our literary community it may not be amiss to note that no report of these appearances of Pasternak's has been printed anywhere at all. A strange situation arose: writers and critics (and the pettier the louder) were arguing against his points, denouncing him, defending themselves against him (and the most immature exercises were printed in full). But what Pasternak actually said must be literally picked out, grain by grain, from the heap of verbose slag which was piled up by the participants of these conferences.

BUT IN SPITE OF all the bureaucratic cunning of the manipulators of literary politics, the meaning of Pasternak's speeches is clear. In these speeches he continued the development of the thoughts expressed by him at the recent plenary meeting at Minsk. The meaning of his words can be summarized to the effect that the country is growing, and with it grow the demands upon art; yet the fundamental ranks of literary workers have lost their way in "banquet-writers' practice", in "trumpeted triviality", which has "become so common with us that it is taken to be obligatory to all". Writers continually impose upon themselves "new, additional chains". "Work is expected of us, and all we do is swear our allegiance".

The literary bosses and their voluntary slaves were superlatively outraged by Pasternak's doubts as to the utility of the entire noisy campaign which in practice means persecution of valuable experiments in the field of art, persecution of artists guilty of such experimentation. He had the temerity to say something else: it is enough for someone among the powerful of this world to throw out a new slogan, and immediately everyone begins to carry it out with frenzy and oppressive uniformity. "If you must howl, at least howl with different voices". Some of the "terribly-sovietized" writers, of the type of Adalis, were at once put on their guard. Did not such a statement smell of an anti-Soviet demonstration?

Pasternak's relations with the official literary authorities have been very complicated from the very beginning. These authorities easily tolerate "low quality of production", imitativeness, even frank spittle-licking. But what they are organically unable to digest are any signs of independence on the part of poets and writers. And it is exactly on this score that Pasternak frequently "sins". This is why official publicity has for years maintained a "conspiracy of silence" in regard to Pasternak, utilizing as an excuse against the poet the "difficult quality" of his verse. Yet, in spite of the difficulty of his poetry, Pasternak's popularity has con-

tinued to grow. The slogan of higher creative quality has placed Pasternak in the first rank of Soviet poetry, in spite of the fact that he has never been ambitious in this connection. To the contrary, unlike very many of our poets, he is distinguished by the absence of petty vanity, by an almost pathological shyness and by his inability to be a "good fellow". This last quality, in particular, is intolerable to our "enthusiasts." What an aristocrat, indeed!

Two circumstances force us to devote all this detailed attention to the conflict with Pasternak. In the first place—fortunately for all sincere partisans of the democratic completion of the revolution—Pasternak is not alone. In connection with the promised democratization of the system, the last months have passed under the aegis of all manner of revealing—and concealing—"conversations." And thus Soviet publicity, too, though as yet tentatively and cautiously, has been compelled to pay some attention to those writers who have, up to this time, stood apart from the "enthusiasts". Only very recently there was printed in the journal *October* some interesting correspondence between a critic and a writer of the above classification (whose name went without mention), concerning some of the most vital questions of literature and life. The writer—Chechanovski tells us—has found all these last years exceedingly difficult. "A master of high quality, he had a phobia of paper. . . In silence, he paced out miles up and down his room". . . "Behind his emotional defenselessness, behind his rather coarse irony, there struggled the healthy confusion of the seeker". What, then, appears to be the source of this writer's confusion? It appears that, during many years, this "talented writer" has seen his power "in the depiction of sufferings. . . Taking himself as a human type, he designated himself as a sympathizer in grief, almost bereft of the ability to share the joy of others". That is why things went badly and seemed doomed; and this same feeling of his "solidarity with the revolution became acutest at a time when solidarity condemned him to a position of inactive contemplation when our affairs were going uphill. . . Then he kept to the side lines, giving as his excuse his inability to tolerate noisy enthusiastic demonstrations".

THE TROUBLE IS not, of course, that the anonymous writer is unable to "share the joy of others". It is that the writer, whose outstanding characteristic is his "solidarity with the revolution", to whom the vital questions of the toiling masses are very dear indeed, has not, during the years of the general line, lost the sense of necessity for "sympathizing with grief". It is precisely the demand of the official ideologists of the general line for the exclusive production of works depicting only "achievements" which has led to such a bumper crop of internally false and essentially anti-democratic effusions. The officially reliable optimistic ideology of these productions co-exists with the most outrageous neglect toward the life and interests of those masses who have actually carried out on their own shoulders the entire burden of gigantic construction.

It is true that our literature has not, during the last years, lacked its "slag". Many productions have indeed been added that are formally reliable as to their ideology, but which are completely devoid of emotional conviction. The reason for this dissonance between the official ideology and the inner voice does not lie in any "trickery". The cause of this dissonance is the anti-democratic character of artistic creations and of literary quality during the entire period of the general line. It would seem that the liquidation of this "line" would be sincerely applauded. Yet the "leaders of literary policy" are least of all inclined to seek a rapprochement with the writers who feel "solidarity with the revolution"; and

during the very first conflict with Pasternak they again relied upon the block of "enthusiasts" for the dictatorship which had begun to form at the inception of the recent general line and which, together with the manipulators of literary politics, carries the moral and political responsibility for the anti-democratic tendency of Soviet art. This, then, is why those writers are politically in error who now trust to the good will or even the automatic operation of the "big broom", which, they hope, will sweep away all at once all the "slag" of life and literature.

The profound internal connection between the destinies of art and the destiny of the entire new society have perhaps never in all the years of the revolution been so apparent. But by the way of an awakening of broad and free public activity, there is no issue out of the social-political crisis through which the country is passing, no road toward the blossoming of a free, really popular and actually revolutionary, art.

Translated by Alexander Bogrow

What Is Happening in Mexico?

• E. Tinoco Davila

WHY WAS CALLES, the former "strong man" of Mexico, packed into a plane and shipped out of Mexico? Why was the C.M.T., the new Mexican labor federation recently organized under the direct protection of the Cárdenas government, to take the place of the old semi-statal C.R.O.M.? Why has the Communist Party of Mexico, up to a short while an unimportant and more or less banned combination, suddenly blossomed forth as a friend of the P.N.R., the State party of Mexico and the Cárdenas government? Is the Cárdenas administration really going to accomplish the social changes that former administrations talked about while they played for immediate money? Answers to these questions must be sought in a critical examination of the history of the Mexican republic since the outbreak of the revolution of 1910.

ALL RESPECTABLE historians observe that the history of Mexico from 1876 to 1910 was free from political and military strife. Porfirio Díaz encouraged railway development, which, we know, always goes hand in hand with the opening up of a backward country to the world market. He encouraged native manufactures with the aid of protective tariffs. He placed the national credit on a sound basis. He managed to do all that, in a large measure, by giving favorable concessions to foreign capital in connection with the gold, copper and oil industries.

On the other hand, as a result of his decree of 1890, the great number of Indian peasants lost their *ejidos*—the communal lands recognized as theirs by the Spanish crown soon after the conquest and constituting their principal means of independent support.

It is evident that this form of "primitive accumulation", the expropriation of the peasant, suited the plans of Díaz and his foreign allies to extend the Mexican market. For capitalism to develop Mexico, such fastnesses of natural production as the *ejidos* had to be destroyed and the peasants sent looking for a livelihood as peons on the large plantations, in the mines and oil fields. As a result of the 1890 decree, 10,000,000 peasants, 60% of the country's population, became serfs on the large estates.

Now while industry developed in Mexico under Díaz's protection and the number of native entrepreneurs increased, the favor shown to the foreign concessionaires stirred national resentment.

Furthermore, Díaz's government became solidified into an exclusive political corporation, into which new politicians could not hope to enter either through election or appointment. For Don Porfirio, who back in 1876 defeated in battle president Lerdo as the champion of a democracy protesting against the reelection of national executives, continued to reelect himself to the presidency till the outbreak of 1911.

THE THREE BASIC causes of the National revolution were, therefore, the misery and discontent of the expropriated rural masses, the discontent of the rising native manufacturing and commercial interests, the dissatisfaction of the suppressed native politicians.

It is significant that Francisco I. Madero, a wealthy liquor manufacturer, became the symbol of the national protest against the Díaz dictatorship. Madero personified the last two mentioned currents of discontent. He challenged Díaz on the basis of the demand for non-re-election and effective suffrage. But by incorporating in his program a demand for agrarian reforms, he attracted the active sympathy of the Mexican rural masses, forming the great majority of the population.

Old Porfirio's rule was challenged, and it became evident that he could find no support in the country. Díaz fled. Then Madero was assassinated. The civil war that followed was no longer a struggle between reaction and revolution. It was a struggle between various revolutionary politicians, most of whom were either directly or indirectly representative of the popular movement for agrarian reforms. But Carranza, belonging, like Madero, to the progressive well-to-do, became the head of the government that was established after the formulation of the Querétaro Constitution in 1917. The new constitution, grounded on the laws and traditions of the Juárez movement of 1857, aimed to solve the three causes of discontent that made the Revolution of 1911.

CARRANZA WAS INTERESTED especially in the institution of political reforms and in the enforcement of the constitutional provisions relating to the national ownership of subsoil metal ore and oil deposits. This brought his government into difficulties with Wall Street and the Bank of England. He was overthrown and assassinated by the ambitious group of revolutionary politicians from Sonora, who were dominated by De la Huerta, Obregón and Calles.

Now that Paraguay is nominally a corporate State, Col. Franco, the dictator-president, proclaims that his republic will be ruled by a "national revolutionary" party modelled after the P.N.R. of Mexico. What is the P.N.R.? You must not fail to reserve for yourself the June issue of the INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

The latter were directly representative of the small ranchers and little businessmen and professionals of Northern Mexico. Their military tool, however, were the brave semi-agricultural Indian tribes of Sonora (the Yaquis, Mayos, etc.) who had been robbed of their land by the Díaz regime. We may say that the poorest section of the rural population of the North found revolutionary representation in Villa, while the peasants of the south-central plateau expressed themselves politically in the Zapata movement. Villa and Zapata were, one after another, defeated and assassinated by the Sonora group. The rule of the latter acquired a solid base when they reached a temporary agreement with the American and financial oil interests. In time the Sonoran politicians fell out among themselves. Wall Street helped Obregón and Calles against De la Huerta, who had the support of the British oil interests. De la Huerta had to flee to eke out a living as a vocal teacher in Los Angeles.

THE GOVERNMENT PERSONIFIED in Obregón and Calles was essentially a nationalist "law and order" government, in spite of the populist language it affected. It turned to the population of the country and to the foreign capitalists, with promises of maintaining peace and order, of practicing economy and promoting the economic and social welfare of the country. The first two promises were addressed especially to the foreign capitalists; the last to the people.

How did the Sonoran regime try to make good its pledge to the foreign capitalists? First, it actually suppressed political disorder. Villa and Zapata, the two principal leaders of the militant movement of the rural masses, were killed. Less important rebels and near-brigands were hunted down and shot. The peasant *agravista* groups were brought under State control and little by little disarmed. Mexican wage laborers were organized in the semi-statal C.R.O.M., and a heavy hand was laid on any recalcitrant troublemakers who refused to obey the "socialist" injunction of the politicians to be reasonable. On the other hand, lawmakers of the republic drafted for the edification of the masses some of the most progressive labor legislation devised anywhere.

These laws were really applied only in the government services. In the large industries they were always, somehow, suspended or compensated in the favor of the employers through persisting low wages. Nevertheless, the "revolutionary" and "advanced" character of the Mexican government began to capture the fancy and sympathy of the liberals and radicals of the United States, who began to turn to unspoiled Mexico as a welcome relief from the "Babbit" materialism of their native land. The Sonora rulers of the Mexican republic "worked" this interest in their attempts to win recognition of Washington. At that time LaFollette played for Mexico the role later acted by Borah in behalf of the U.S.S.R.

FOR SOME TIME THE AGRARIAN and petroleum questions caused strained relations with the United States. In the first place, it was impolitic and difficult to take away from the peasants the American and British owned land they had reclaimed for their use. This difficulty was adjusted with the help of a mixed claims commission, by 1927. The fact was the peasants did not take much land. They did not have the means of fully exploiting the land about them, and the agricultural credit promised by the government remained almost entirely on the paper of the enthusiastic prospectuses issued by the State printing department. By 1927, the limitation of the acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners became a law and for several reasons did not seem to bother alien land owners. The peasants took no more land, and the former owners were finally recompensed through a bond issue.

The petroleum policy of the Calles-Obregon regime was a little more involved. The Queretaro Constitution drafted in 1917 by the revolutionists united under the nominal leadership of Carranza not only provided for the limitation of the acquisition of agricultural property but also called for the return to national ownership of all subsoil deposits. This second provision was not applied by the Obregon administration of 1920-1924 for the simple reason that the government drew most of its income from taxes on petroleum production. The Supreme Court of Mexico very conveniently upheld the contentions of the foreign petroleum companies that objected to the Constitution. This stimulated their activity. Oil production reached in 1921 the record-breaking total of 193,397,586 barrels. The Sonoran politicians thrived on petroleum taxation.

In 1924, Obregón gave way to Calles, but remained Mexico's "strong man" behind the scenes. By then the government was again in a deplorable financial condition. Calles adopted a drastic policy of retrenchment. The national railways were returned to private ownership, thus subtracting their share from the total national debt. Calles suppressed a threatened railway workers' strike by "federalizing" the railway service. Then he started to play around with the alien land and petroleum law, which upon his recommendation had been confirmed by the Mexican Congress in 1925 to the great enthusiasm of all good Mexicans who could read the papers. For here seemed to be the fullest expression of the anti-foreignism that filled so many revolutionary hearts.

THE TRUTH IS that these laws merely enable Calles, whose government was then in need of money, to talk turkey to the American companies, which apparently remained masters in the field after De la Huerta lost for the British. Secretary of State Kellogg protested vehemently in behalf of the American oil interests. But the Mexican Congress approved one article of the petroleum law requiring owners of the surface who acquired their titles prior to May 1, 1917, to exchange them for "confirmatory concessions" good for 50 years. As a conclusive argument, Calles' Congress followed this up with another article threatening to have the national government take over the property of owners not complying with the law. As a result, there was a private discussion in Wall Street. This led to just as private an arrangement between the Mexican government and the bad foreign capitalists. In consequence, the Supreme Court of Mexico declared both inconvenient articles unconstitutional (in obvious contradiction with the Constitution of 1917). Calles proposed some amenable executive regulations of the oil law and everybody was happy. The net results were the suppression of certain small oil field exploiters and a secret financial adjustment between the Americans and the revolutionary politicians.

IT IS NECESSARY to include here a description and explanation of Calles' feud with the Catholic Church in Mexico. The conflict between State and Church reached its climax at the time when Calles was bargaining with the petroleum people. Now the Constitution of 1917 confirmed the decrees of Juárez, according to which all ecclesiastical real property was nationalized and the Church disestablished and disendowed. By 1926, the Church no longer disposed of real property other than the church buildings and immediate premises. What was the purpose of the presidential edict of 1925 ordering the strict enforcement of the religious and educational provisions of the Querétaro Constitution? Calles' edict had two objectives: to weaken a traditional rival agency of public opinion, which was not quite ready to acknowledge as everybody else in Mexico the supremacy of the Sonora politicians; to keep occupied with the good old religious issue the thought and the

"revolutionary" proclivities of such important strata of the Mexican people as organized labor and the advanced elements among the agrarians. For nobody would dare to doubt the "revolutionism" of a government that made the priests and bishops wear their collars buttoned in the front.

Who fought against the government in the Catholic uprisings? Who were the active Cristeros, the queer folk who soaked in oil and burned alive defenceless girl teachers to the cry of "Christ is King"? They were for the most part the small ranchers of Jalisco and Michoacan, horsemen somewhat akin to the ruling Sonorans in ethnic makeup, an element of the population less dependent on the promises of the government than the mute Indian peasants around them.

THUS BY 1928 ALL THE MAIN problems of the Mexican Revolution were said to have been solved or near a solution. Yet in 1935 the Finance Department of the revolutionary government could comment sadly that 161,000 foreigners living in Mexico alone possessed \$3,616,195,864, whereas 17,000,000 Mexicans owned the total sum of \$3,140,804,136. In other words, in Mexico foreign capital is still the absolute master. Furthermore, in spite of all the

land and labor laws and the varied "social" program continually flaunted by the "revolutionary" masters of the country, the Mexicans are poorer than ever. For surely the \$3,140,804,136 mentioned above is very unevenly distributed. More than half of the rural population still lives in a state of absolute destitution and ignorance, and are still forced by their poverty to seek work on the domains of big proprietors under the worst conditions imaginable. (That is the side that the romantic accountant Stuart Chase did not see when he went to spend a sociological honeymoon among the sarapes, tiles and moons of Mexico.)

This leads us to a consideration of the role played by Mexican organized labor during and after the Revolution, and then to a study of the P.N.R.—the curious single State party of Mexico, the "democratic" arm of the entrenched "revolutionary" politicians, the political machine of Obregon, Calles, Gil and Cárdenas, the full name of which is the Grand National Revolutionary Party, and which like "national revolutionist" parties in other lands suppresses with deportation and execution the least sign of competition by any other political organization.

(Concluded in the June issue)

Goering: a Biography

• Konrad Heiden

From "Neue Weltbühne," Praha, Czechoslovakia:

"THE FRANK SOLDIER with the child's heart"—who can recognize Goering in this description? That is what Goebbels calls him in his *Journal*. Perhaps Goebbels wanted to say, as prudently as possible, that the Air Minister of the Reich was a backward individual, not too intelligent, but well stocked with the combative insolence of an adolescent.

The official biographies of Goering, written in praise of him, credit the bold hero with a long series of exciting and rather absurd exploits. In fact, the political activity of Goering obliges us to admit that he possesses, if not the heart, then at least the brain of a child. His behavior at the Buergerbraukeller affair during the putsch of November 1923; his flagrant inferiority in the struggle against Papen, when he was president of the Reichstag; and finally his lamentable controversy with Dimitrov at the Leipzig trial; none of these acts gives proof to political acumen. Was he not naive enough to tell an important foreign visitor that "you must not be surprised that the Reich Bishop Meuller wages such a bitter fight against his non-Hitlerite opponents. In his capacity as bishop of the Reich, he gets juicy emoluments, and no man would give that up willingly."

IN HIS BIOGRAPHY OF GOERING, H. Sommerfeld says of his hero: "He has never been a cool thinker." Indeed, he has not. But that does not stop the reorganizer of the air forces of the Reich from being a man who can calculate when his own interests are concerned. Consider the following facts. The former war

flyer married the rather well-to-do Swedish baroness Karin Fock in 1920. In 1924 he found himself almost penniless. Wounded in the "Feldherrnhalle" affair, he fled to the Tyrol, where he spent all he had left, playing the role of the great gentleman in a luxurious hotel of Innsbruck. In Rome and in Stockholm, his wife's native city, he lived rather poorly. Several times he was obliged, according to his own story, to leave his watch in the pawn shop.

But in 1928 he was back in Germany and was getting his 600 marks a month as a Reichstag deputy. He installed himself in a rather comfortable apartment in the fashionable Wilmsdorf district. He began to lead the existence of a bachelor (his wife had stayed behind in Sweden) who does not consider such trifles as expenses. 600 marks a month is not much, and Goering sank up to his Adam's apple in debt. However, collectors and bailiffs did not scare him. Where did a poor and needy politician who had not yet besmirched his mandate find money?

There could be no difference between a Reichstag deputy and a Reichsminister. In 1933, when Hitler took power, he proclaimed that the highest salary of an official would not exceed 12,000 marks a year. It is true that since the advent of the Hitlerite party, Goering has taken to himself a number of positions. He is President of the Prussian Council. He has exercised for some time the functions of a Minister of the Interior. He is the Air Minister of the Reich, and he is still the president of the unemployed Reichstag. But we must not forget that the Republic of Weimar promulgated a law according to which an official who occupies several posts cannot collect at the same time several salaries. And Hitler's government has not as yet abolished this law.

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YET SINCE 1933, Goering has augmented the luxury in which he lives. He possesses several houses, his uniforms are innumerable, his marriage with Emmy Sonnenman was a sumptuous ceremony the like of which had not been seen even in the days of the Empire. According to official accounts, the groom gave the bride a diadem worth 36,000 marks. We can only guess at the value of her wardrobe and the cost of the attendant festivities.

Now just as astounding is Goering's freedom from prejudice in things concerning money. In the midst of Hitler's anti-Semitic Reich, the present Air Minister actually named a man of Jewish descent, one Edward Milch, as his "general of pilots". Edward Milch was director of the "Lufthansa" when Goering was only a simple Reichstag deputy. In his capacity as deputy, Goering had to make reports concerning the activity of the large aviation company. Furthermore he used to sell to the Lufthansa the parachutes he manufactured in partnership with a friend by the name of Koerner. Koerner is at present Goering's Secretary of State.

IT IS USUAL in the National-Socialist State for important dignitaries to permit themselves to accept gifts. To the Reichspräsident von Hindenburg, Goering gave, in supplement to the president's Neudeck estate—a quietly private gift by Industry—, a second domain, sliced out of State property. Soon after Hindenburg nominated Goering to the generalcy. Old Field Marshal Mackensen, too, received the gift of some State property. Thereupon the doughty field marshal resigned from the Stahlhelm, opposed by the government. And to the Minister-President himself the municipality of Berchtesgaden gave a stretch of 10,000 square miles for a villa. At an evening gathering, a well known big industrialist once whispered with a meaningful grimace, referring to one of the best known personages of the System: "He takes!"

Hermann Goering was born in 1893, in the Bavarian town of Rosenheim, not far from Hitler's birthplace, though his family is of Prussian origin. He was a cadet at Karlsruhe and at Lichterfelde, then became an officer of the active army.

During the war, he disobeyed the orders of his superiors, taking secret lessons as a pilot thanks to his friend Loerzer, and became one of the best aviators in the German army. We know that by the close of the war, he commanded the famous "Richthofen" squadron, receiving for his services the decoration "Pour le Mérite".

FRONT FLIERS EXERCISE an important influence on the choice of planes and motors. Dr. Fritz Gerlich, who was killed on the 30th of June 1934, produced documents showing that Goering had business dealings with the Bayerische Motorenwerke. Among these documents was a letter addressed to Goering by a fellow aviator and war comrade which referred to "gold cigarette cases placed under a napkin at a business dinner".

On page 33 of his biography (naturally inspired by Goering himself), Sommerfeldt remarks all of a sudden, without apparent connection to the rest of the text: "The Fokker D-VII pursuers had been furnished with the BMW motor, by the means of which these planes could surpass all enemy machines."

During the war, Hermann Goering tarried for a while at Stenay, which is not far from Charleville, where the crown-prince had his headquarters. The latter's establishment had been widely criticized for its gayety. There Goering made the acquaintance of Friedrich Wilhelm, whom he found very useful later. There he also became friends with Prince Philip of Hesse, whom he later made "oberpraesident" of Prussia.

Now the Prince is the son in law of the King of Italy. This connection played no small part in producing the prestige enjoyed by Goering in Adolf Hitler's scheme of things. Conscious of his strong position, the fat aviator has permitted himself a number of sins which Hitler would not have forgiven in anybody else.

After the war, Goering was a commercial flier in Denmark and Sweden, where he met his first wife.

IN 1921 HE SAW HITLER for the first time. The meeting took place at a demonstration in Munich. According to Goering, he was fascinated by Hitler at first sight. In any case, he joined the National Socialist Workers' Party. At the close of 1922 he was the supreme chief of the S.A. He was wounded in the 1923 putsch.

The occupation of a front flier is very dangerous. But in a certain sense, it has its gratifying side. The war aviator is the pampered darling of the army. He is allowed a great deal of free time, good pay and receives every possible distinction. But the nerves suffer markedly in this constant coming and going between death and champagne. As a result many fliers take to drugs.

Goering, too, became a drug addict. According to a reliable source of information, he spent some time in a Swedish sanatorium. He also underwent a cure shortly before Hitler's accession to power. His weakness for morphine is possibly only another indication of the man's "unbridled" temperament.

He has a mania for decorations and uniforms. He enjoys his power in a sweeping uncontained manner. He finds pleasure in having the rooms of his apartments photographed for reproduction in popular magazines. The day when his first wife was buried was made by him a national day of sorrow. One year after, his wedding day became, at his command, a national jubilee. Everything about him is so immoderate that it seems almost harmless. He works in a half-dark room lighted by two giant candles. Behind him, on the wall, hangs an ancient executioner's sword. This may be called morbid and gruesome. It is also somewhat comical.

For it is all too possible that a man with a strong will to dominate and with morbid instincts may also be much of a fool. Goering's eyes appear to be deep with reflection, but this "profoundity" is quite illusory. Goering is really a simple, fat Caliban-like sort of individual. He is an animal possessing strong lusts and little corrective judgment.

He is greatly overestimated especially because the Nazis have played him up as the "diplomat of the movement". But in fact the diplomat in this case was merely a man who more than anybody else in his clique had mastered the art and manner of the embassy attaché. That is, he knew how to dine, drink, dance and chase after women. Here was a type straight out of the officers' casino. Thanks to these qualities, he came to know and dominate the most important affairs of his party. For it is quite probable, now that Roehm and his friends are dead, there are few who know the secrets of the party as well as Goering.

Of all the Nazi chiefs he is the least National-Socialist. He is a happy careerist. A short while before his party took over the state, he remarked quite openly at war fliers' banquet: "The Sozen (Social-Democrats) held power for ten to twelve years. I wonder if we can hold on as long."

WHEN GOERING APPEARS on the scene, one has the feeling that a fat woman is entering. Then the demon in him becomes apparent—in a manner somewhat suggestive of a chief eunuch.

He passes for a sadist, because he once said: "I'd rather over-shoot or shoot too short than not shoot at all"!; because he promised "to destroy and uproot" all opposition; because already in 1923 he wanted to have all hostages killed in cold blood; because since

1933 he has had his opponents beheaded with the medieval axe. But it is apparent that Goering is too crude an organism to be described as a sadist. The "soldier with the child's heart" is simply a beast bereft of judgment and feeling. There are hundreds of thousands of Nazis for whom human beings are merely targets to shoot at. And so Goering looking down from the flier's vantage point sees the "image of God" merely as an object to hit. It would, of course, have been better for all concerned if he had not been let out of the morphine fiend's cell.

HE PERSECUTES OUT OF NAIVE hate. An example of this hate is his fight against Roehm; another is his struggle with Gregor Strasser; a third, his affair with Papen; the next will perhaps be an open fight against Goebbels. Papen as Reich chancellor was partly a thing of Goering's making. Later the creature outwitted his maker. This resulted in incessant hate and persecution. In

1933 Papen was to become the "Ministerpraesident" of Prussia under Hitler. But he did not take Goering into account. Papen had dictated certain observations about the cabinet meetings to his secretary, who was a real countess. The countess gave the notes to a friend who—wonder of wonders!—went to spend some time in a Communist summer resort, where by a rare coincidence Goering's secret police found them. With these notes in hand, Goering went to Hitler. In consequence not Papen but Goering became the "Ministerpraesident" of Prussia. But this success did not cool Goering's hatred. A year later, on the 30th of June 1934, Papen was to be killed by the Ministerpraesident's men. Only his flight to the Reichswehr Ministry saved him.

Translated by Ann Follini

(In a forthcoming issue of International Review, *Goebbels the Demagogue Dwarf*, an intimate biography by a world famous journalist.)

The Road to Power

• Jonathan Ayres

IN THE DOCTRINE of the post-war Communist parties, the rule "it *must* be done through soviets" and the glorification of the leadership principle are complemented by the dogma of "armed insurrection." In apparent opposition is the tendency of the old-style Social-Democratic parties to emphasize that they will always keep their "revolutionary" activity "within the law."

When the Bolshevik "communist" organization calls its more sedate sister "reformist," no reference is meant to the fact that the latter recruits support on the basis of a program of reforms. Because the Bolshevik "communist" movement does this very thing. At times it competes in its line of reform promises with such revolutionaries as the Nazis. By "reformist" the post-War Bolsheviks do not mean "reformist" but "legal." To them the revolutionary way is the way of armed insurrection. They are for illegality at any price.

This conception is not merely an outcropping of the stock misinterpretation of the historic level and the aims of the Russian Revolution, the example of which is ever the perfect manual of action for the non-Russian Bolshevik. It is, in fact, the reaction of the social-democrat "militant" to the unbudgeable truth that:

Work for reforms does not contain its own motive force, independent of revolution. It moves, in each historic period, only in the direction that has been given to it by the last revolution, and as long as this impulsion continues to make itself felt. Reforms can move only on the framework of the social form created by the last revolution.

The laborite militant finds that the traditional social-democratic program of reforms does not yield him control of the State—the supreme expression of force in society—for the purpose of a social revolution. A program of reforms enables a successful social-democratic party to use the State for the purpose of re-

forms which serve the constant adjustment of developing capitalism. Disgusted with reality, the social-democrat militant attempts to recruit, by means of the same program of reforms, a following that would help him overthrow the existing State in a military contest!

THIS RESULTS IN such phenomena as the colossal and pitiable bluff that figured as the "Communist revolutionary danger" in pre-Hitlerite Germany. There a huge, bolshevized "vanguard party"—full of confidence in the efficacy of "correct leadership" at the "psychological moment"—attracted as many as six million votes by means of a program of such promises as a liberal dole, heavy taxation of the rich and "national German liberation"—repudiation of the Versailles Treaty. Sitting pretty on the top of this "revolutionary mass" support, the self-styled vanguard talked loud about the coming armed insurrection, which, it claimed, was the only revolutionary way. In the manner of rehearsals for the rising this vanguard was going to engineer, young members of the party and sympathizers were sent out to get their heads broken by policemen's clubs in planned desultory "battles for the streets" that took place on Red Sundays and Red Wednesdays, underlined as such in their calendar by the generals of the revolution. Then the "revolutionary vanguard," the protagonists of the armed insurrection, folded up apologetically. For another "vanguard" party—also bolshevized in structure, also glorifying the principle of leadership, also mouthing fiery phrases, also manipulating a mass following recruited on the basis of nationalistic promises and social reforms—won State power quite the "legal" way, by means of an election. The day after the Nazi victory, the praesidium of the Communist International issued a statement that the German Bolshevik party did not fight, did not insurrect, only because they had not yet won the backing of the majority of the proletariat. The benighted correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* wrote that the German Bolsheviks "preferred illegal defeat to legal victory." In fact, their defeat was altogether legal. In spite of their customary bluster about armed uprisings, the only extra-legal acts that the German Bolsheviks permitted themselves were police-regulated street demonstrations. An imaginable victory of theirs—in view of the program by which they recruited their following—would not have been any other than a "legal" social-democratic victory for reform.

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PROPAGANDA IS not revolutionary merely because it calls for the use of armed force. Neither can the use of armed force always be called illegal. "We are revolutionary in the sense that we aim at a basic revolution (change) of the present social order."

The propaganda of the Communist Party in pre-Hitlerite Germany was reformist, unrevolutionary, though it blustered about arms and uprisings. Historic experience has shown that a program of reforms does not lead to a basic change.

"Historic events cannot be controlled by prescribing regulations, but by realizing beforehand their probable measurable consequences and taking measures accordingly." The tactics of the revolutionary proletariat must correspond to the material situation facing it. The means resorted to by the revolution are determined by historic—national, economic, and political—circumstances. The measure of the correctness of the means used is contained in the following question: "Do they lead to a basic social change?" The dogma of legality or illegality is reduced to an absurdity by practical contingencies.

A party or movement that really means to conquer power and has confidence in its ability to acquire popular backing and strength does not prate about insurrection, neither does it forswear violence in advance.

The preaching of armed insurrection as a *sine qua non* condition of a revolution, stands in the way of popular adhesion and understanding. It is an expression of essential weakness and a lack of confidence in the ability of the masses to learn to understand their historic interests. Like the dictum "It must be done through soviet!", "armed insurrection," as an article of faith, is bound up with the hope of a more or less sudden and devastating social debacle that would enable a "revolutionary minority" to dominate the situation for its idealistic purposes.

ON THE OTHER HAND, a party that opposes revolution presenting itself as a historic necessity, because of its regard for formal legality, becomes "a powerless obstacle in the way of the class struggle, which in time would triumph without it, and even against it." (*The Belgian Experience*, p. 53.) For "far from being dethroned by legality, violence appears as the basis and the real protection of legality—as much from the side of the bourgeoisie as from the side of the proletariat." (*Ibid.* p. 56).

A socialist revolution cannot be made by a minority manipulating a *Massengroll*, a blind revolt of the mass. Neither can it be brought about as a result of the mere numerical superiority of a quiescent majority. Socialism cannot be instituted by

a set of *führers* giving orders, whether these orders are constitutional or unconstitutional.

Practically, the presumptuous vanguard attitude, the self-approved sovietic shrewdness and the loose talk of armed insurrection affected by the Leninist "professional revolutionists" lead to the greatest psychological resistance of the workers against the efforts of the self-appointed leaders. For proof of this see the net results of the hectic exploits of the Bolshevik "communist" parties outside of Russia from 1918 to date. Estimate the millions of dollars and vast energy wasted in the various "tactical" moves by which the working class, or peasants, of this and that country were going to be "stampeded" into following the "right leadership."

The righteous respect for the established legal institutions typical of the conservative branch of the Social-Democracy engages the workers to respect bourgeois legality at all times, leaving them helpless in face of reactionary violence. Year after year, the hope of the masses is roused by the laborite politicians who offer to take office to fix capitalism so that it will behave kindly. The masses are invariably disappointed; capitalism will not act contrary to its nature. When popular reaction comes, it sometimes takes the form of fascism and rides roughshod over the same law-respecting minorities.

BOTH THE UNMASKED reformism of the conservative wing of the Social-Democracy and the confused romantic reformism of the Communists stand in the way of the socialist revolution, which must be distinguished from the various nationalist emancipatory movements.

The socialist revolution will be the conquest of power by the overwhelming majority in behalf of the overwhelming majority. It will be recognized as the product of the decomposition of bourgeois society. It will therefore carry in itself the political and economic legitimation of its opportune appearance.

The party of the socialist revolution will proclaim that it represents the interests and, in time, the constitutional will of the majority of the people. It will adopt the method of armed force when that is the most practical and least costly way for the majority to express its constitutional will.

When the wide mass strives to win the State, the concentrated and organized force of society, for the purpose of a basic social change, then the opposition of the anti-socialist minority will have the status of a "pro-slavery rebellion" daring to withstand a revolution made legal and constitutional by virtue of the overwhelming support of the population.

Fascism and Terrorism in Japan

• Edmond Demaitre

From "Marianne", Paris

I

ALTHOUGH the Japanese have a habit of imitating with furious haste any example set by Europe, we have not yet seen, black, brown, blue or red shirts in the streets of Tokyo, but there is probably no country in the world which fosters so many Fascist organizations as the Empire of the Rising Sun. For these organizations can scarcely be called secret or terrorist, inasmuch as their activities are public and they make no use of terror to obtain their political ends. They are organized after the manner of political parties, but are all in accord on one point:

that the Parliamentary System must be abolished and a dictatorship established.

An estimate that does not seem to be exaggerated puts the number of Fascist groups in Japan at almost 130, and the total of their adherents at over two million.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT of these groups is the Dai Nippon Kokusai Kai, who are recruited from the ranks of the Seyukai party. Its program comprises three points: 1. the restoration of Samouraism; 2. return to the Emperor of all his previous powers, and devotion to him to the point of sacrifice; 3. return to the ancient Japanese traditions.

The Ken Koku Kai, another fascist group, also demands that the Emperor be made dictator, but makes it essential that all adherents of any brand of "socialism" whatsoever be outlawed.

Among other of the more important Fascist organizations we find the Kokuhonsa, headed by Baron Hiranuma, who is looked upon by them as the future dictator of the country. Members of the Supreme Council of this group include General Araki, Admiral Osumi, former Minister of Marine, Admiral Kato Chief of the Marine Staff, and Doctor Wali. Unlike Hitler or Mussolini, Baron Hiranuma never appears in public, never makes a speech, and professes a positive dread of crowds. He leads a life of celibacy, something quite extraordinary in Japan, and his spartan way of living has become legendary in Tokyo.

THE KOKUHONSA IS ORGANIZED after a curious hierarchic system. Its members are divided into three classes: the chiefs, paying members and non-paying members. The paying members number about one hundred thousand, mostly university students.

The Kochi Sa is remarkable for the philosophic character of its ideals. It demands, of course, the abolition of the present parliamentary system. In addition it wants freedom of thought, *equality* in political life, *fraternity* in economic life, and *unity* in moral life, regardless of the contradictions implied in such a doctrine.

In the Nippon Soujiha Domei we find what may be called a "Rousseauistic Fascism". Its leaders, including the well known author Takanobu Murobushi, believe that it is parliamentism which prevents the return of mankind to nature. Therefore they would abolish parliament and have everyone take up his abode in the forest. In the meantime, awaiting the abolition of parliament, they have founded a communal farm, whereon they live and preach their "Rousseaufascist" ideals.

Sesauto, considers the abolition of the metric system to be of vital importance for the future of Japan. Though it is hard to see the connection between the metric system of weights and measures and the parliamentary system of government, the party has more than ten thousand members.

Lastly the Dai Nippon Koku Kai is a Fascist association composed of retired army and navy officers. It is led by Generals Kikouchi and Sato and Admiral Ogasawara. Their program is almost identical with the programs of all the other military associations, demanding the dissolution of parliament and the regulation of the capitalistic system. . . .

II

BUT THE MOST FORMIDABLE opponents of the parliamentary regime are not the military clans and the Fascist and Nazi organizations in Japan, and they are by no means the only ones. There are also large secret associations, whose pitiless terrorism is mainly directed against the heads of the great political parties. . . .

During my voyage to Japan I had the good luck of witnessing the trial of Lieutenant Innuoye, one of the most active members of a terrorist ultra-nationalistic association called the "Brotherhood of Blood". Lieutenant Innuoye was for many years head of the Japanese Spy Service in China; on his return to Japan he joined a religious sect and became very active, his influence extending far and wide in the very heart of numerous Pan-Asiatic organizations.

Seated impassively in the dock the young officer told the presiding judge: "We had decided to bomb the capital from military aeroplanes, which we meant to borrow from the aerodrome at Kasumigaura. . . ."

THE JUDGES DID NOT SEEM to be surprised. The president of the Court merely took a few short notes on a sheet of paper and continued to question Lieutenant Innuoye, who replied always

with the same serenity and politeness. The examination was conducted like a conversation between two well-bred gentlemen, each showing a keen interest in the affairs of the other. . . .

Occasionally the voice of the presiding judge betrayed indignation, especially when the young officer stated that he had intended to kill, among others, Prince Saionji, the last of the "Genros." But, when the accused said, a moment later, that after two days of deliberation the conspirators decided to strike the name of the revered old man from the list of those condemned to die, the same judge made a gesture which seemed to say: "Very good, my child, very good, that certainly shows your good feelings."

I WATCHED THE PUBLIC. It was made up of lawyers, a few officers, politicians and newspaper men. What struck me most was that while they condemned the tactics of the conspirators it was clearly apparent that they gave them their sympathy. The thirteen accused men were aware of this. The atmosphere was in their favor and this knowledge increased the calmness and assurance apparent throughout in their words and gestures.

These thirteen officers, who proposed to murder on the same day Prince Saionji, the last of the Genros, the Lord Chamberlain Kantaro Suzuki, the Minister of the Imperial Household Baron Iki, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shidehara, all belonged to the same secret association: the "Brotherhood of Blood". In May 1932 members of this organization assassinated the President of the Council, Inoukei, and attempted the murder of Baron Wakatsuki, whom they had never forgiven for having signed the London naval treaty.

THIS SOCIETY IS ALSO responsible for the massacre which has taken place in Tokyo. As a matter of fact these attempts were not aimed at the party in power—the "minseito"—by the party of the opposition—the "seyoukai"—but against parliamentism in general, which the Brotherhood of Blood accuses of sacrificing the army and navy budgets for purely financial and political purposes.

Neither the members nor the leaders of this society were impelled by motives of personal ambition. Having suppressed the men whose political views they deemed evil, they have no thought of supplanting them.

A Japanese well acquainted with their aims and operating methods said to me recently: "We understand that men who are suitable for the task of overthrowing a regime and instituting another in its place are not necessarily capable of assuming the task of government."

THE MEMBERS OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF BLOOD are recruited mostly from the army. Those of the other great secret association—the Koku Rykai (Black Dragon) are essentially civilians, principally university students. All of these secret societies employ the same methods and their aims are identical. Their programs include: seizure of the reins of government by violence, abolition of the parliamentary system, the muzzling of the press, institution of a dictatorial government, regulation or socialization of big industry, and big business, the setting afloat of a navy as large as that of the United States or Great Britain, a vigorous armament policy, and assurance of the political and economic expansion of Japan on the Continent of Asia.

NEITHER THE BROTHERHOOD OF BLOOD nor the Black Dragon should be compared to the secret societies of Ireland or the Spanish juntas. The secret associations of Japan have a dread of publicity. They have neither offices nor newspapers; they do not organize public demonstrations nor march in parade in the streets.

If I can rely on information given me in Japan they seem to be organized according to the cell system. The members of a society do not know each other and no one of them knows who is the supreme head of the organization. To gain admittance into one of these associations it is necessary to submit to an extremely severe inauguration ceremony.

Commands are blindly executed; death is the punishment for cowardice or treachery. This does not mean, however, that the leaders of these secret associations themselves attend to the execution of their victims. As a rule they simply condemn them to commit suicide, as was the Japanese custom some sixty years ago. When the Japanese psychology is taken into account, it is easy to understand that these orders are respected. If the police were to investigate the causes of the numerous suicides committed in Tokyo during the past few years, they would first make a point of finding the political friends of the victims. . .

FURTHERMORE, TREASON IS NOT THE ONLY offense punishable by death; mistakes, even though involuntary, carry the same penalty, a typical example of which occurred during the Innuoye trial. At the time when the aerial raid over Tokyo was planned by the conspirators, Lieutenant Nichida had been entrusted with the duty of ascertaining whether the police had or had not knowledge of the plot. After scrupulous investigation, Lieutenant Nichida believed he could assure his chiefs that the police had no wind of the projected raid. Without doubt he was mistaken, since a few days later the thirteen conspirators were arrested. Although it was proved that Lieutenant Nichida was not guilty of any understanding with the police, he was found dead in his suite two days after the arrest of his comrades. It is hardly necessary to say that his assassin was never found. . .

For the arms of the Japanese secret associations are as long as Allah's!

Translated by Anne Bishop

Capitalism and the State

• Rosa Luxemburg

This is the fourth chapter of "Reform or Revolution", translated for the first time into English and reproduced serially in the International Review. The editors of the International Review have not copyrighted this translation because they believe that the book was written for the propertyless of the world and not for the exclusive material benefit of clever "revolutionary" professionals. It therefore appeals to borrowers not to copyright their "loans." A word to the "vanguardist" shrewd should be sufficient.

THE SECOND condition of the gradual realization of socialism is, according to Bernstein, the evolution of the State in society. It has become a commonplace to say that the present State is a class State. However, we believe that this, too, like everything referring to capitalist society, should not be understood in a rigorous, absolute manner but dialectically.

The State became capitalist with the political victory of the bourgeoisie. Capitalist development modifies essentially the nature of the State, widening its sphere of action, constantly imposing on it new functions (especially those affecting economic life), making more and more necessary its intervention and control in society. In this sense, capitalist development prepares little by little the future fusion of the State and society. It prepares, so to say, the return of the function of the State to society. Following this line of thought, one can speak of an evolution of the capitalist State into society, and it is undoubtedly this that Marx had in mind when he referred to labor legislation as the first conscious intervention of "society" in the vital social process, a phrase on which Bernstein leans heavily.

But on the other hand, the same capitalist development realizes another transformation in the nature of the State. The present State is, first of all, an organization of the ruling class. If it assumes functions of a general interest that favor social development it is specifically because, and in the measure that, these interests and social development coincide, in a general fashion, with the interests of the dominant class. Labor legislation is enacted as much in the immediate interest of the capitalist class as in the interest of society in general. But this harmony endures only up to a certain point of capitalist development. When capitalist development has reached a certain level, the interests of the bourgeoisie,

as a class, and those of economic progress begin to clash even in the capitalist sense. We believe that this phase has already begun. It shows itself in two extremely important phenomena of contemporary social life: on one hand, the policy of tariff barriers, and on the other, militarism. The two phenomena have played an indispensable, and in that sense a progressive and revolutionary role in the history of capitalism. Without tariff protection the development of large industry would have been impossible in various countries. But at present the situation is different.

At present, protection does not serve as much to develop young industry as to maintain artificially certain aged forms of production.

From the angle of capitalist development, that is, from the point of view of world economy, it matters little whether Germany exports more merchandise into England or England exports more merchandise into Germany. From the viewpoint of this development it may be said that the slave has done his work and it is time for him to go his way. Given the condition of reciprocal dependence in which the various branches of industry find themselves, a protectionist tariff on any commodity necessarily results in raising the cost of production of other commodities inside the country. It therefore impedes industrial development. But that is not so from the viewpoint of the interests of the capitalist class. While industry does not need tariff barriers for its development, the entrepreneurs need tariffs to protect their markets. Which signifies that at present tariffs no longer serve as a means of protecting a developing capitalist section against a more advanced section. They are now the arm used by one national group of capitalists against another group. Furthermore, tariffs are no longer necessary as an instrument of protection for industry in its movement to create and conquer the home market. They are now indispensable means for the cartelization of industry, that is, means used in the struggle of the capitalist producers against consuming society in the aggregate. What finally brings out in an emphatic manner the specific character of contemporary customs policy is the fact that today not industry but agriculture plays the predominant role in the making of tariffs. Which means that the policy of customs protection has become a tool for converting and expressing the feudal interests in the capitalist form.

THE SAME CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE with militarism. If we consider history as it was—not as it could have been or as it should have been—we must agree that war has constituted an indispensable factor of capitalist development. The United States of America, Germany, Italy, the Balkan States, Poland, all owe the conditions or the rise of their capitalist development to wars, whether resulting in victory or defeat. As long as there were countries marked by internal political division or economic isolation which had to be destroyed, militarism played a revolutionary role, considered from the view point of capitalism. But at present the situation is different. If world politics have become the stage of menacing conflicts, it is not so much a question of the opening of new countries to capitalism. It is a question of already existing *European* antagonisms, which having been transported into other lands have exploded there. The armed opponents we see today in Europe and on other continents do not range themselves as capitalist countries on one side and backward countries on the other. They are rather States pushed to conflict especially as a result of their similarly advanced capitalist development. In view of this, when an explosion takes place, it is certain to be fatal to this development, in the sense that it must provoke an extremely profound disturbance and transformation of economic life in all countries. But the matter appears entirely different when considered from the angle of the *capitalist class*. For the latter militarism has become indispensable. First, as a means of struggle for the defence of “national” interests in competition against other “national” groups. Secondly, as a branch of placement for financial and industrial capital. Thirdly, as an instrument of class domination over the laboring population inside the country. In themselves, these interests have nothing in common with the development of the capitalist mode of production. What demonstrates best the specific character of present day militarism is the fact that it develops generally in all countries as an effect, so to speak, of its own internal, mechanical motive power, a phenomenon that was completely unknown several decades ago. We see this in the very inevitability of the complete indecisiveness of the objective and motive of the conflict and its accompanying circumstances. From a motor of capitalist development militarism has changed into a capitalist malady.

In this clash between capitalist development and the interests of the dominant class, the State takes a position alongside of the latter. Its policy, like that of the bourgeoisie, comes into conflict with social development. It thus loses more and more its character as a representative of the whole of society and is transformed, at the same rate, into a pure *class* state. Or to speak more exactly, these two qualities distinguish themselves more from each other and find themselves in a contradictory relation in the very nature of the State. This contradiction becomes progressively sharper. For on one hand we have the growth of the functions of a general interest on the part of the State, its intervention in social life, its “control” over society. But on the other hand, its class character obliges it to move the pivot of its activity and its means of coercion more and more into domains which are useful only to the class character of the bourgeoisie and have for society as a whole only a negative importance, as in the case of militarism and tariff and colonial policies. Moreover, the “social control” exercised by this State is at the same time penetrated and dominated by its class character. See for example the manner with which labor legislation is applied in all countries.

THE EXTENSION OF DEMOCRACY, which Bernstein sees as a means of realizing socialism by degrees, does not contradict but, on the contrary, corresponds perfectly to the transformation realized in the nature of the State.

Conrad Schmidt declares that the conquest of a social-democratic

majority in Parliament is another direct road to this gradual “socialization” of society. Now the democratic forms of political life are without question a phenomenon expressing very clearly the evolution of the State in society. They constitute, to that extent, a move toward a socialist transformation. But the conflict within the capitalist State, described above, manifests itself even more emphatically in modern parliamentarism. Certainly, in accordance with its form, parliamentarism serves to express, within the organization of the State, the interests of the whole of society. But what parliamentarism expresses here is capitalist society, that is to say, a society in which *capitalist* interests predominate. Consequently, in this society, the representative institutions, democratic in form, are in content only the instruments of the interests of the ruling class. This manifests itself in a tangible fashion in the fact that as soon as democracy shows the tendency to negate its class character and to become transformed into an instrument of the real interests of the population, the democratic forms are sacrificed by the bourgeoisie and by its State representatives. That is why the idea of the conquest of a parliamentary reformist majority is a calculation which, entirely in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism, preoccupies itself only with one side—the formal side of democracy—but does not take into account the other side, its real content. All in all, parliamentarism is not a directly socialist element impregnating gradually the whole of capitalist society. It is, on the contrary, a specific means of the bourgeois class State, helping to ripen and develop the existing antagonisms of capitalism.

In the light of the history of the objective development of the State, the declaration by Bernstein and Konrad Schmidt that increased “social control” results in the direct introduction of socialism is transformed into a formula that finds itself from day to day in greater contradiction with reality.

The theory of the gradual introduction of socialism proposes a progressive reform of capitalist property and the capitalist State in the direction of socialism. But in consequence to the objective laws of existing society, one and the other develop in a precisely opposite direction. The process of production is increasingly socialized, and State intervention, the control of the State over the process of production, is extended. But at the same time, private property becomes more and more the form of open capitalist exploitation of the labor of others, and State control is at the same time penetrated with the exclusive interests of the ruling class. The State, that is to say the *political* organization, and the property relations, that is to say the *juridical* organization of capitalism, become more *capitalist* and not more socialist, opposing to the theory of the progressive introduction of socialism two insurmountable difficulties.

Fourier's scheme of changing, by means of a system of phalansteries, all the water of the seas on the globe into fine lemonade was surely a phantastic idea. But Bernstein, who proposes to change the sea of capitalist bitterness into a sea of socialist sweetness, by progressively pouring into it bottles of social-reformist lemonade, presents an idea that is merely more insipid but no less phantastic.

The production relations of capitalist society approach more and more the production relations of socialist society. But on the other hand, its political and juridical relations establish between capitalist society and socialist society a steadily rising wall. This wall is not only overthrown but is on the contrary strengthened, consolidated, by the development of social reforms and the course of democracy. What can overthrow this wall is only the hammer blow of revolution, that is to say the *conquest of political power by the proletariat*.

(The fifth chapter of Rosa Luxemburg's work will appear in the June issue of the International Review. Its subject is *Practical Consequences of Social Reformism*.)

Two Incidents

• Kaete Kenta

From "Neue Weltbühne," Praha:

THERE WAS TUMULT outside. Heavy steps; loud voices. The door burst open. A kick; a woman fell, head downward, into the room. She lay lifeless, her face pressed to the floor.

Anna! We sprang from our seats. Sobbing we knelt by the unconscious form. We took off her torn and blooded clothing. We carried her to a bed. Oh, that poor woman! Blood ran in thin stripes from her mouth and nose. Clots of blood clung to her head. Her body was covered with finger-thick livid welts. We washed off the blood. We bathed her face with cold water. Groaning, but indifferent to her surroundings, she lay before us.

Grete trembled so much, she could hardly help. What had happened?

What had happened? An examination. The Gestapo came from Dresden. Anna's husband is a Communist. They suspected that he was hiding somewhere in Germany. They asked Anna to tell them where he was. She is more or less ignorant of politics. But you know the usual thing. No caution or silence stops them. Nobody is more careful and self-possessed than Anna. Oh, they only wanted to know where her husband was hiding. They attempted to extract the information from her with blows. It was not the first time they used that method, and it will not be the last.

Anna lay limp, and she did not regain consciousness. Nothing was left but to call the doctor. But what were we going to tell him? We might by no means say that the unfortunate woman was beaten. Finally the oldest of the inmates got up courage to go to the administration. She reported that a woman fell into a faint.

The doctor came. He did not ask what had happened. He understood. His diagnosis was: a concussion of the brain. He prescribed rest and cold compresses on the head.

We continued to worry about Anna. She had regained consciousness. Her vomiting had stopped. She complained of splitting aches in the head and could not eat. After three days, the doctor came again. He tried to have her get up. She fell again into a faint and was put down. He ordered to have her remain lying and counselled rest. She was therefore left in the common hall; where there is never any quiet. This lasted four weeks.

Anna was on her feet. She could do only very light work. Her fainting spells returned repeatedly. She never regained her health. THERE WAS WITH US a young girl whom we treated with as much consideration and indulgence as if she were sick. She was a pretty thing, as old as Grete. Evening after evening she sat quietly at the common table, holding her head in her hands, throwing troubled looks about her. Two older inmates sat down near her and tried to engage her in conversation. "You must do it, Lene," they told her. "You must report it, no matter what happens."

Lene had her bed near Grete's. The two girls had become friends. One night, Grete heard the other weep. She could not sleep. "What is the matter with you?" she asked. Lene told her. Her story was brief. Two sentences sufficed to tell everything.

After she had been two months in the compound, the supervisor's assistant, the most feared man in the concentration camp, came into the common room. Lene was called out—to an examination, we thought. They feared she would return in the same state as Anna. But it was worse. Lene was not taken to an examination. She was taken to the assistant-supervisor's room. Neither her crying nor attempts at self-defense were of any avail. He was stronger. And if her cries had been heard, nobody would have dared to come to her aid. Not every member of the garrison was so much of a beast. Some S.A. men would protect the women from the indecencies of their comrades. But against the assistant-supervisor they were helpless.

And now Lene's condition was quite obvious. It was the third month.

She finally dared to go to the administration to complain against the highly placed Nazi.

THE NEXT EVENING, Lene sat again at the common table. She was paler and more downcast than before. Of course, she had not succeeded in reaching the supervisor. They laughed at her condition. One day she was taken out and put into prison. We never heard of her again.

Translated by O.G.

RACE PURITY

(For German Fishes)

Mackerel caught off the German, Norwegian and Dutch coasts and which live in the North Sea are distinguished from Breton and Russian mackerel by certain immediately recognizable features. The Nordic mackerel is large and fat, while those that come from farther south are small and thin.

In the region of Julland, there has been observed a hybrid mackerel (the product of the mixture of the Nordic and Slav-Baltic races). Fishermen are loath to catch this mackerel, as the mongrels have a tough meat. They are used, however, to feed the bigger fishes as well as the seals kept in zoological gardens.

It is obvious that the crossing of these different races of the mackerel is dangerous for the Nordic mackerel, which will finish by being absorbed by the unworthy oriental mackerel.

From "Rasse und Umwelt" by Johann Ernst Scholtz, a member of the Rassenamt (Racial Bureau) of Hamburg.

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